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The Assembly, 
Draft Resolution 
on national parliaments, European security and defence 
and the road to the 1996 intergovernmental conference 
( i) Stressing the importance of the success of the 1996 intergovernmental conference for implementing 
a true European security and defence policy, built around WEU; 
(ii) Convinced of the need to associate national parliaments closely with the development of a Euro-
pean security and defence policy in the framework of the preparation of the 1996 intergovernmental 
conference; 
(iii) Considering that the intergovernmental conference must result in a clear division of responsibilities 
in security matters between the European Union and WEU and, in defence matters, between WEU and the 
member states; 
( iv) Noting with concern the weakness of Europe's means of intervention and particularly the fact that 
the CFSP can take only economic or diplomatic measures, whereas there are numerous sources of crisis 
and conflict in the centre of Europe, the Caucasus, the Mediterranean and Africa; 
(v) Wishing to strengthen its links with the national parliaments and to co-operate on a basis of equality 
and reciprocity with the European Parliament in order to achieve better parliamentary supervision ofWEU 
in joint security and defence questions and of the European Union in CFSP questions; 
(vi) Believing that any steps towards bringing defence matters within the competence of the European 
Commission and European Parliament might endanger the effective scrutiny of defence and security mat-
ters by national parliaments and the WEU Assembly, 
INviTEs THE PARLIAMENTS OF MEMBER COUNTRIES 
1. To intensify parliamentary co-operation with a view to implementing an effective system of parlia-
mentary supervision of the CFSP and European defence; 
2. To promote exchanges between their respective foreign affairs, defence and European affairs com-
mittees and their co-operation with the corresponding committees of the WEU Assembly with a view to 
preparing the 1996 intergovernmental conference and subsequently the satisfactory implementation of the 
decisions the conference will be called upon to take; 
3. To encourage greater transparency on the part of governments regarding their European policies so 
as to enable parliaments to exercise more effective supervision, keep public opinion informed and make it 
aware of the issues at stake in the European process. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Sir John Hunt, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. The Maastricht Treaty includes a series of 
protocols and declarations adopted at conferences 
of representatives of governments of the member 
states of the European Union, held in Rome, on 
15th December 1990, and Brussels, on 3rd 
February 1992. One such declaration, on the 
" role of the national parliaments in the European 
Union " states that it is important to encourage 
greater participation by national parliaments in 
the activities of the European Union. 
2. Admittedly, since the inception of the 
European Economic Community, national parlia-
ments have been involved in European affairs to 
varying degrees, albeit in a general way, and since 
the executive is pre-eminent in the management 
of national political affairs, their role has not 
always matched their expectations. Debates on 
the direction of government policy on Europe and 
examination and voting on community legislation 
adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Union 
give national parliaments only a relative right to 
oversee and supervise choices made by the Euro-
pean Union in the areas for which it is respon-
sible, the consequences of which affect all mem-
ber countries and the political life of each one. 
3. Although long dominated by economic, 
social and cultural questions, an important quali-
tative change was introduced into the European 
debate with the entry into force of the Maastricht 
Treaty. This provides for the establishment of a 
common foreign and security policy (Title V of 
the Treaty), directly concerned with two distincti-
ve symbols of national sovereignty: foreign poli-
cy and security (and its corollary, defence). The 
implementation of the CFSP is doubtless one of 
the greatest challenges the Union must face if it 
wishes to be more than just an economic power, in 
a world that has become unsettled, unstable even, 
since the main East-West confrontation gave way 
to a myriad of local conflicts, domestic and 
foreign, political, economic and military. 
4. The responsibility of national parliaments 
in this area has increased, for such issues extend 
beyond the boundaries of the fifteen European 
Union member states, since they concern the 
Union's role and place in the world and determi-
ne, in part, the behaviour towards it of other inter-
national players: states, regional groupings, inter-
national organisations. The implementation of the 
CFSP transcends purely national frames of refe-
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rence, making joint thinking about its implica-
tions imperative, and equally so the emergence of 
a European parliamentary consciousness which 
has its roots in the national parliaments, them-
selves the guardians of the sovereignty of the 
nations that make up the European Union. 
5. Furthermore, national parliaments are not 
the only assemblies concerned with European 
policy. The European Parliament, the WEU 
Assembly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Assembly 
and the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE, to 
mention only the most prominent such institu-
tions, are all party, often randomly, to the debate 
on matters relating to the CFSP. Two of them, the 
European Parliament and the WEU Assembly, are 
nevertheless more directly concerned with deve-
lopments in relation to this question. 
6. The European Parliament, whose powers 
are strengthened under the Maastricht Treaty, 
wishes to play the leading role as the parliamen-
tary component of the CFSP. Since Maastricht, it 
has several times taken a position on matters of 
foreign, security and defence policy in Europe, 
basing itself on Article J.7 of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union, which provides that" the presidency 
shall consult the European Parliament on the main 
aspects and the basic choices of the common 
foreign and security policy and shall ensure that 
the views of the European Parliament are duly 
taken into consideration ... " . Henceforth it will 
inevitably have to be taken into account, being 
associated with the preparatory work for the 1996 
intergovernmental conference, which is to deal, 
inter alia, with the future evolution of the CFSP 
and consequently the role WEU is called upon to 
play in these matters as the defence component of 
the European Union. 
7. The WEU Assembly has no intention of 
relinquishing its powers which are based on 
Article IX 1 of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
Through its recommendations to the Council of 
Ministers and other initiatives, including a collo-
quy in Paris in October 1994, which brought toge-
ther the chairmen of parliamentary defence and 
foreign affairs committees of all countries linked 
I. " The Council of Western European Union shall make an 
annual report on its activities and in particular concerning the 
control of armaments to an Assembly composed of represen-
tatives of the Brussels Treaty Powers to the Consultative 
Assembly of the Council of Europe. " 
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to WEU and Russian parliamentarians, the 
Assembly is contributing to thinking in WEU, 
preparatory to the intergovernmental conference. 
This contribution is of prime importance as the 
conference's decisions on WEU will affect the 
Assembly's future work and existence. 
8. The national parliaments for their part are 
intensifying their co-ordination, as the inter-
governmental conference approaches, through 
two forums: CEAC (Conference of European 
Affairs Committees) and the Conference of Spea-
kers of National Parliaments, which also have a 
liaison role with the European Parliament which 
has a seat on both. 
9. Without prejudging the outcome of the 
intergovernmental conference, it can be said that 
the development of the CFSP, and, in particular, 
the possible inclusion of defence alongside secu-
rity aspects, will be one of the most sensitive sub-
jects for debate. The limits and areas of responsi-
bility of the CFSP must be better defined, on the 
basis of existing experience and through judicious 
and flexible application of the principle of subsi-
diarity so as to avoid institutions being paralysed 
and with due respect for the sovereignty of mem-
ber states. To this end, it would be desirable, at the 
conference, to redefine the institutional links bet-
ween the Union, the member states, other Euro-
pean and transatlantic organisations involved and 
the national parliaments. 
11. European security and defence: towards a 
common policy 
10. In his welcoming address to delegations of 
the Assembly of WEU, meeting in Paris for the 
June 1994 session, the President of the French 
National Assembly, Philippe Seguin, observed 
that " the new world situation unfolding before us 
demonstrates how essential is the need for greater 
co-ordination among European states in matters 
of defence and security ". 
11. This admission of inadequacy is also an 
indictment of the relative failure to implement the 
CFSP, even if account is taken of the very short 
time the Maastricht Treaty has been in force. 
12. Simultaneously, WEU has launched a pro-
cess of adaptation to the new geostrategic situa-
tion in Europe by also taking into consideration 
the Maastricht decisions that confirmed it as the 
defence component of the European Union. In the 
run-up to the intergovernmental conference, 
whose decisions on the CFSP will have repercus-
sions on the organisation, WEU is developing its 
own thinking on its future role in the context of 
deepening the CFSP and the possible inclusion 
therein of the defence dimension. 
4 
(a) European Union and the CFSP 
13. The Maastricht Treaty is the outcome of a 
laborious and complex process of discussion and 
compromise between the member states of the 
European Economic Community, the incomplete 
nature of which is illustrated by the decision to 
convene a conference, in principle in 1996, to cla-
rify certain matters in relation to the functioning 
of the European Union and the CFSP. 
(i) Title V of the Maastricht Treaty 
14. The CFSP is the subject of Title V of the 
Maastricht Treaty, which comprises Articles J to 
J.ll. Although in practice, its application seems 
very remote from the text, the latter nevertheless 
includes a series of provisions binding on states 
which have subscribed unreservedly to that part of 
the treaty 2• 
15. Article J.l.2 sets out the five principal 
objectives of the CFSP, namely: 
- to safeguard the common values, funda-
mental interests and independence of the 
Union; 
-to strengthen the security of the Union 
and its member states in all ways; 
- to preserve peace and strengthen interna-
tional security, in accordance with the 
principles of the United Nations Charter, 
as well as the principles of the Helsinki 
Final Act and the objectives of the Paris 
Charter; 
- to promote international co-operation; 
- to develop and consolidate democracy 
and the rule oflaw, and respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. 
16. It is important to bear these objectives in 
mind, as to misunderstand them often creates 
confusion and disappointment when progress on 
the CFSP is being evaluated. In point of fact, 
these objectives stem from the search for a 
consensus likely to be acceptable to all the coun-
tries of the Union, and have led the latter, first, to 
align themselves on general, even vaguely wor-
ded principles, and, second, to defer the necessary 
discussion on procedures for implementing them 
and possibly extending them to defence matters 
until the 1996 conference. 
17. The second and third paragraphs of the 
same article reveal a concern to make the CFSP 
an instrument for affirming the Union as a power 
that counts, not only in economic terms but also 
2. Denmark is not involved in the elaboration and implemen-
tation of decisions and actions of the Union with defence 
implications. (European Council, Edinburgh, 11th-12th 
December 1992. Conclusions of the Presidency, Part B). 
politically, and, by a time yet to be defined, mili-
tarily. It is in this perspective that one must consi-
der Article J.4 which refers to "the eventual fra-
ming of a common defence policy which might in 
time lead to a common defence" (Article J.4.1). 
This article, which also concerns WEU, refers to 
the 1996 intergovernmental conference " and 
having in view the date of 1998 in the context of 
Article Xll 3 of the Brussels Treaty ", to the dis-
cussion on the role that WEU will be called upon 
to play in its relations with the Union. 
(ii) The 1996 intergovernmental conference 
18. The Maastricht Treaty is the result of a 
hasty but necessary compromise, the aim of 
which was to position the European Union vis-a-
vis the political and military changes that had 
occurred in Europe and the rest of the world since 
the end of the 1980s. Nevertheless, the consensus 
rule did not allow decisions of major scope to be 
taken, above all in the area of the CFSP. Hence the 
decision to convene a conference of representa-
tives of governments of the member states in 1996 
to examine " those provisions of this treaty for 
which revision is provided" (Article N.2). 
19. The 1996 review must deal with the follo-
wing topics, referred to in the Treaty on European 
Union: 
- the policies and forms of co-operation 
introduced by this Treaty (Article B of 
the Treaty); 
- the common foreign and security policy 
(Article J.4.6); 
- widening the field of application of the 
procedure known as eo-decision (new 
Article 189 B of the Treaty establishing 
the European Community); 
- possible definition of a hierarchy of the 
different categories of community acts 
(Declaration on the hierarchy of Commu-
nity acts); 
- extension of the responsibilities of the 
Community to three new areas: energy, 
civil protection and tourism (Declaration 
on civil protection, energy and tourism). 
20. In fact, the intergovernmental conference is 
also to decide on the new European architecture 
best fitted to meet the challenges of the future, be 
they political, economic, military, social, ecologi-
3. Article XII of the modified Brussels Treaty provides that 
" After the expiry of the period of fifty years, each of the high 
contracting parties shall have the right to cease to be a party 
thereto provided that he shall have previously given one 
year's notice of denunciation to the Belgian Government". 
Unlike the Council of Ministers, the Assembly of WEU takes 
the view that the period of fifty years runs from 1954, the 
date of signature of the modified Brussels Treaty, and not 
1948 (Brussels Treaty). 
5 
DOCUMENT 1459 
cal, etc. The debate on institutional questions will 
be central to the discussions since only when an 
optimal framework for decision-making has been 
defined, avoiding extremes of national or pro-
European sentiment, will the Union be able to 
give a coherent content to its decisions in essential 
areas like the CFSP and implement them effecti-
vely. 
21. Looking beyond the debate on deepening 
and widening, on federal Europe " a la carte " and 
on the respective roles and powers of the Council, 
the Commission, the European Parliament, the 
national parliaments and other institutions and 
organisations, the question is basically whether 
the evolution will be towards renationalising 
European policies or " Europeanising " national 
policies. The answer will be decisive for defining 
the role and place of Europe as a political and eco-
nomic unit in the world of 2000. As far as secur-
ity and defence are concerned, WEU, linked in 
accordance with Article J.4 to the intergovern-
mental conference process, is the organisation 
best placed to devise a project that is coherent, 
clear and devoid of all ambiguity. 
(b) WEU and the definition of a common European 
defence policy 
22. WEU is the only European organisation 
with responsibility in security and defence mat-
ters. Nevertheless, despite its reactivation in 
1984, it still gives the impression of not being in a 
position to exercise that responsibility fully in 
face of the geopolitical and geostrategic changes 
of the last five years. Its evolution is a gradual 
process which also takes account of the evolution 
of the two other organisations with which WEU is 
linked, i.e. the European Union and NATO, as is 
apparent from study of the texts adopted at Maas-
tricht in 1991 and Noordwijk in 1994. To these 
documents must be added the memorandum on 
the United Kingdom Government's approach to 
the treatment of European defence issues at the 
1996 intergovernmental conference released on 
2nd March 1995, which presents a series of pro-
posals for strengthening the organisation. 
(i) The Maastricht declarations 
23. Annexed to the Maastricht Treaty are two 
declarations by WEU member states intended to 
define the organisation's place and role in relation 
to the European Union and NATO. 
24. In the first, member states "agree on the 
need to develop a genuine security and defence 
identity and a greater European responsibility in 
defence matters ". To achieve this " WEU will be 
developed as the defence component of the Euro-
pean Union and as a means to strengthen the 
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance ". 
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25. In asserting itself as the "defence compo-
nent ", WEU may appear to be linking its future to 
the institutional development of the Union, as the 
organisation has committed itself at the same time 
to a review, in 1996, of its declaration annexed to 
the Maastricht Treaty, in parallel with the inter-
governmental conference (point D of the declara-
tion on Western European Union). 
26. Furthermore, WEU states that it is " prepa-
red, at the request of the European Union, to ela-
borate and implement decisions and actions of the 
Union which have defence implications". To this 
end, the declaration presents a series of measures 
aimed at developing " a close working relation-
ship " between the two organisations (point A of 
the declaration), namely: 
- synchronisation of the dates and venues 
of meetings and harmonisation of wor-
king methods; 
-establishment of close co-operation bet-
ween the Councils of Ministers and the 
respective secretariats; 
-harmonisation of the presidencies; 
- keeping the Commission informed on 
WEU activities; 
- encouragement of co-operation between 
the WEU Assembly and the European 
Parliament. 
27. The second declaration concerns the enlar-
gement of WEU to include the member states of 
the European Union and other states, members of 
NATO. According to this declaration: 
" States which are members of the Euro-
pean Union are invited to accede to WEU 
on conditions to be agreed in accordance 
with Article XI of the modified Brussels 
Treaty, or to become observers if they so 
wish ... ". 
Simultaneously, European member states of 
NATO are offered associate member status. 
28. Nevertheless, application of the text is not 
easy, despite its apparent simplicity. In practice, 
since the decisions taken by the Council in Peters-
berg in June 1992, only one member state of the 
European Union, Greece, has become a full mem-
ber ofWEU. Denmark has requested observer sta-
tus, as has Ireland. When Austria, Finland and 
Sweden joined the Union it was thought that two 
of these countries, if not all three, might qualify to 
join as full members but in fact, for the time 
being, they only have observer status, placing 
them, in theory, in a position similar to associate 
partners 4 in WEU, although they are entitled to 
4. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic. 
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take part in the discussions at the 1996 inter-
governmental conference that will deal with the 
CFSP and consequently with WEU's future. 
(ii) The Noordwijk declaration 
29. At the Kirchberg meeting on 9th May 1994, 
the Council of Ministers, in line with the deci-
sions taken at Maastricht and within the frame-
work of the preparation of the intergovernmental 
conference, requested the Permanent Council to 
begin work on the definition of a European defen-
ce policy. The Dutch presidency had the task of 
preparing a preliminary document which was exa-
mined and adopted by the WEU ministers at 
Noordwijk on 14th November 1994. 
30. The document defines four levels of Euro-
pean responsibilities and interests in defence mat-
ters (II.4), as follows: 
- WEU governments have a direct respon-
sibility for the security and defence of 
their own peoples and territories; 
-[they] have a responsibility to project the 
security and stability presently enjoyed in 
the West throughout the whole of Europe; 
- [they] have an interest, in order to rein-
force European security, in fostering sta-
bility in the southern Mediterranean 
countries; 
- [they] are ready to take on their share of 
the responsibility for the promotion of 
security, stability and the values of demo-
cracy in the wider world, including 
through the execution of peace-keeping 
and other crisis-management measures 
under the authority of the United Nations 
Security Council or the CSCE 5, acting 
either independently or through WEU or 
NATO. They are also ready to address 
new security challenges such as humani-
tarian emergencies, proliferation, terro-
rism, international crime and environ-
mental risks, including those related to 
disarmament and the destruction of 
nuclear and chemical weapons. 
31. This list is not exhaustive. These are mere-
ly the broad outlines to be followed, for the docu-
ment also states that " the full development of a 
common defence policy will require a common 
assessment and definition of ... the substance of a 
European defence .. . This will in turn depend 
upon a judgment of the role the European Union 
wishes to play in the world and the contribution it 
wishes to make to security in its immediate neigh-
bourhood and in the wider world " (II.6). This is 
tantamount to assigning the task of elaborating a 
5. Now OSCE: Organisation for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe. 
European security and defence policy to the Euro-
pean Council, when it should rather be the res-
ponsibility ofWEU, as the defence component of 
the Union, to deal with all aspects of this question. 
32. At the same time, it should be borne in 
mind that these preliminary conclusions represent 
but a first step for WEU towards preparation of 
the intergovernmental conference; this explains 
their generalised tone, which is also linked to the 
need for member states to reach consensus on the 
definition of European defence and its objectives. 
In this connection it is noteworthy that the list as 
it stands does not include the defence of Europe's 
economic interests, although this important aspect 
of contemporary international relations falls 
within WEU's sphere of responsibility 6 and the 
United States has integrated this aspect fully into 
its concept of national security 7• Since 1st April 
1995, France has also established a committee on 
competitiveness and economic security for which 
a secretariat is provided by the National Defence 
Secretariat-General under the supervision of the 
Prime Minister 8• A report to the President of the 
Republic on the powers of this committee notes 
that control over the flow of information governs 
economic performance and hence job protection. 
It underpins international power relations which 
may be confrontational or tend towards partner-
ship9. 
33. In order to deal with this new situation, the 
report advocates a new organisation of strategic 
information around the notion of " economic 
intelligence ", defined as " a body of co-ordinated 
research, processing, dissemination and protec-
tion of information activities bringing together the 
state and the world of business ... " . This aware-
ness, in a context where cold war confrontation 
has partly given way to increasing economic com-
petition between large commercial groups (as has 
been evident from the GATT negotiations and the 
creation of the World Trade Organisation) extends 
beyond a strictly national framework as a result of 
growing interpenetration and integration of the 
economies of the countries of the European 
Union. 
6. Article VID.3 of the modified Brussels Treaty provides 
that " At the request of any of the high contracting parties the 
Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit 
them to consult with regard to any situation which may 
constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat 
should arise, or a danger to economic stability. " 
7. In an interview with Newsweek on the Franco-American 
espionage question which surfaced at the end of February 
1995, the Trade Secretary of the Clinton Administration, Mr. 
Ron Brown stated that United States national security 
interests were inextricably linked with its economic interests. 
(Quoted in Le Monde, 2nd March 1995). 
8. Official Journal of the French Republic, No. 80, page 
5376, 4th April 1995. 
9. Idem, page 5375. 
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(iii) The memorandum of the United Kingdom 
Government 10 
34. The memorandum on the United Kingdom 
Government's approach to the treatment of Euro-
pean defence issues at the 1996 intergovernmental 
conference was released on 1st March 1995. This 
was the first contribution by a European govern-
ment to the preparation of the IGC dealing with 
European security and defence matters. 
35. The main thoughts set out in the memoran-
dum are as follows: 
- NATO is the central component of the 
security and defence of Europe; 
- Europe must be more outward looking, 
" pulling its full weight internationally and 
acting as a power for good in the world "; 
- WEU " has an important and growing 
role to play in the development of a Euro-
pean security and defence identity ". It 
must remain autonomous and separate 
from the European Union; 
- " the basis for European action in the 
defence and security field should be 
intergovernmental, based on co-operation 
between nation states ". 
36. On WEU, in order to improve the decision-
making process, the memorandum proposes crea-
ting " a new WEU body at head of state and 
government level involving full members, asso-
ciate members and observers ". This body 
" would be built on the WEU treaty base and the 
rights and responsibilities of its members would 
thus mirror those already in force in the WEU 
Council ". At operational level it is necessary to 
"strengthen WEU's planning capabilities" and 
" develop its practical arrangements such as a situ-
ation centre and improved intelligence-handling 
capabilities ". 
37. This document has been quite well received 
in other European Union and WEU countries. It is 
clear nevertheless that this contribution is open to 
discussion and possibly to amendment during the 
intergovernmental conference, particularly in 
regard to the question of decision-making proce-
dures in the new consultative body proposed in 
the memorandum, in the event of that idea being 
adopted. The role assigned to the associate part-
ners in such a body must also be clarified in order 
to avoid the latter being left " out in the cold ". 
Nor is there mention of the democratic supervi-
sion that parliaments might exercise over the deci-
sions of this body, the WEU Assembly having 
only a consultative role - unlike the European 
Parliament which has certain powers of eo-deci-
sion and supervision in the European Union. 
10. WEU Assembly document AIWEU/DG (95) 9. 
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Ill. Parliaments in Europe and their rOle in 
the common foreign and security policy 
38. Annexed to the Maastricht Treaty are two 
declarations concerning the national parliaments, 
one on " the rOle of national parliaments in the 
European Union", the other on" the Conference 
?f Parliame~ts ". In ~oth cases the principle is to 
mvolve parliaments m the Maastricht process and 
also to reassure them in view of the wider powers 
of the European Parliament within the European 
Union. 
39. Nevertheless, the attention the contracting 
parties pay to the national parliaments can also be 
explained by political considerations with the aim 
of facilitating ratification of the treaty. Further-
more, the two declarations on the role of national 
parliaments, which are still very general, place the 
emphasis on co-operation with the European Par-
liament. If the trend in the framework of the CFSP 
~s t_owards a common defence policy, which WEU 
IS mtended to embody, reference should also be 
made to the WEU Assembly, even if the prelimi-
nary conclusions on this question adopted by the 
Council of Ministers in Noordwijk make no refe-
rence to the Assembly's role. 
(a) National parliaments and preparation of the 1996 
intergovernmental conference 
40. The intergovernmental conference is of the 
utmost interest to the national parliaments. The 
decisions to be taken on the future of the Euro-
pean Union will have political, economic and 
social consequences which must be carried into 
effect in each member state with the essential co-
operation of the national parliaments. It is there-
fore logical that the latter should, from now on 
c:ontribute to the reform of the European institu~ 
twns. 
41. Their task is a delicate one in relation to the 
CFSP, as the shape of the latter is still ill-defined 
and no decision has yet been taken on its nature. 
<?n this point, pr?posals have been made by par-
liaments or Within them, which, not having yet 
been finalised, are still subject to debate and 
amendment during a process which will continue 
until 1996 and beyond. 
(i) The French proposals: the European sen-
ate and interparliamentary committee 
42. In France, the Senate and the National 
Assembly, through their delegations to the Euro-
pean Union, have put forward proposals for the 
preparation of the intergovernmental conference 
that accord an important place to the question of 
parliam~ntary s';lp~rvision. These proposals were 
set out m detail m three reports published in 
December 1994 and February 1995. 
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43. The Senate has published two reports 11 on 
the preparation of the intergovernmental confe-
r~nce which present the idea of creating, along-
side. the European Parliam~nt, a second European 
parliamentary chamber which would allow natio-
nal parliaments closer participation in the Euro-
pean decision-making process. This " chamber of 
national parliaments whose powers would be dif-
ferent to those of the European Parliament ... 
would s_upplement the control exercised by the 
latter with a control rooted in national political 
life". 
44. Its powers " might relate first and foremost 
to areas which fall outside the community deci-
sion-making process ... primarily the second and 
third pillars of the Union ... Moreover, the second 
chamber might exercise control over the principle 
of subsidiarity, a task not currently undertaken by 
any of the institutions of the Union .. " 12• 
45. As to its composition, "the members of 
!his ~ssemb~y would si~ i_n national delegations ... ; 
m this way Its composition might be adjusted in 
accordance with the participation of states in the 
yarious aspects of the intergovernmental pillars or 
m related forms of co-operation between member 
states. Thus the Assembly of WEU might become 
one of the formations of the European Senate, the 
one made up of parliamentary delegates of the 
WEU member states ... " 13 
46. " Its membership should, for reasons of 
consistency, be determined in relation to the 
weighting of voting within the Council: one 
might, for example, envisage that the number of 
members of the parliamentary delegation of a 
state should be equal to double the number of 
votes that state has in the Council; one would 
thus, under present conditions, arrive at an assem-
bly of 174 members ... ". 
4 7. This " European senate ", the aim of which 
would be to introduce an element of parliamen-
tary supervision into areas of intergovernmental 
co-operation and which would have a role distinct 
from that of the European Parliament (limited to 
supervision of the single " community " pillar) 
" would be a simplification compared with the pre-
sent situation since it would be based on a clear 
~efi~riti?n of the roles of each one, while today's 
mstltutwnal grey area between the second and 
~d pillars is a source of confusion of responsibi-
lities and procedural conflicts" 14• 
11. Senate, Information Reports 104, 2nd December 1994, 
and 224, 15th February 1995. 
12. Senate, Information report 104 on the preparation of the 
1996 intergovernmental conference, 2nd December 1994, 
pages 41-42. 
13: Senate, Information report 224 on the reform of the insti-
tutions of the European Union (Vol. I), 15th February 1995, 
page 39. 
14. Idem, page 40. 
48. The delegation of the National Assembly to 
the European Union has proposed the creation of 
an " interparliamentary committee to ensure the 
participation of national parliaments in the deci-
sion-making process of the Union" 15• This com-
mittee " would be composed of a number of repre-
sentatives, that might be fixed between three and 
six for each member state. States with bicameral 
parliaments might share the seats between their 
two assemblies in accordance with their own 
constitutional system. This committee would thus 
be a renewed version, with enhanced powers, of 
the present Conference of European Affairs Com-
mittees (CEAC) ... ". 
49. The committee would be competent to exa-
mine" the major decisions of the European Union 
and subjects which, by their nature, fell outside 
the area of responsibility of the European Parlia-
ment: revision of treaties, international agree-
ments and enlargement of the Union, the budget 
and in particular receipts, internal and judicial 
affairs. The committee would also be the author-
ity for appropriate parliamentary supervision of 
decisions relating to the restricted circles estab-
lished for currency and defence matters. On all 
these questions the committee would give consul-
tative opinions ". 
(ii) The United Kingdom debate: strengthening 
the role of the national parliaments 
50. . In the United Kingdom, the preparation of 
the mtergovernmental conference and the policy 
on an enlarged and reformed European Union 
have been a source of extremely lively debate. An 
important place is given to the question of parlia-
mentary supervision of decisions taken in the 
Union, a question which the Prime-Minister, Mr. 
John Major, has undertaken to present to the 
conference 16• 
51. A consensus is emerging within the main 
parliamentary groups in favour of a more active 
presence by national parliaments in the European 
process; there are divergences only as regards the 
means, with most Conservatives in favour of bet-
ter definition and a reduction of the powers of the 
European Parliament in favour of national parlia-
ments, while Labour and the Liberal Democrats 
generally advocate strengthening the powers of 
the European Parliament within the limits impo-
sed. by community legislation and closer co-ope-
ratiOn between the latter and national par-
1.5. National Assembly, Information report 1939 on institu-
tiOnal reform of the European Union, 8th February 1995, 
pages 99-100. 
16. See in this connection the debate on the European Union; 
Hansard, House of Commons, Vol. 255, No. 62, Col. 1063, 
1st March 1995. 
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liaments 17• The idea of a European second cham-
ber, representing national parliaments has also 
met with a degree of support within the United 
Kingdom Parliament 18• 
52. Parliamentary supervision was not develo-
ped in the United Kingdom Government's memo-
randum on " the treatment of European defence 
issues ", which confined itself to noting the exis-
tence of the Assembly of WEU as the parliamen-
tary component of European defence 19• But the 
government is paying close attention to it as is 
evident :f!om a confidential information note by 
!he Foreign Secretary on the preparation of the 
mtergovernmental conference, extracts from 
which have been published in the press 20• 
53. This note states that: " building up a formal 
role for national parliaments through treaty 
amendment would not only be fraught with diffi-
culty but would tend to require inputs from parlia-
ments which are significantly more integrationist 
than Westminster ". To deal with this difficulty, 
the authors of this document propose " to tread 
carefully in this area, avoiding treaty amendments 
wh~rever possible in favour of practical steps 
designed to enable the United Kingdom Parlia-
me!lt to enhance its role in European affairs. " 
This text also addresses a question of prime 
importance, that of the effectiveness of European 
parliamentary supervision exercised by national 
p~liaments, observing that: " Despite a general 
Wish to bring national parliaments into the frame 
it seems highly doubtful whether the involvement 
of 15. parliaments in testing subsidiarity would in 
practice lead to a more positive outcome in indivi-
dual cases. " 
54. The United Kingdom Government's propo-
sals on European defence in the memorandum 
submitted to Parliament by the Prime Minister on 
1st March are the subject of continuing debate and 
scrutiny in both Houses of Parliament· select 
committees in both the House of Comm~ns and 
the.House of Lords are currently examining issues 
which may be raised at the IGC, including links 
between the EU and WEU. 
(iii) The German debate: the Lamers-Schiiuble 
document 21 
55. In early September 1994, the CDU/CSU 
parliamentary group published a document: 
Thoughts on the European Union in the frame-
17. See for example the debate on the 1996 intergovernmen-
tal conference; Hansard, House of Lords, Vol. 562, No. 53, 
col. 272-357, 8th March 1995. 
18. Idem, col293. 
19. WEU Assembly; AIWEU/DG (95) 9, page 7. 
20. The Times, 9th March 1995. 
21. Bulletin Europe (Documents) No. 1895/96, 7th Septem-
ber 1994. 
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work of preparations for the parliamentary elec-
tions to be held in November of the same year. 
This document had repercussions beyond Ger-
many's borders on account of its proposal for a 
multi-speed Europe, built around a central core of 
five or six countries, hinged upon France and Ger-
many. Taking what might be described as a " pro-
integration " stance, this text, in addition to its 
arguments in favour of the " hard core " approach, 
deserves credit for highlighting certain short-
comings from which the European Union suffers, 
especially in relation to the common foreign and 
security policy. 
56. These " thoughts " do not represent the 
views of the Bundestag, but probably provide a 
reference in the discussions in the German Parlia-
ment concerning the preparation of the intergo-
vernmental conference. According to the authors 
of the text, the European process has reached a 
critical stage in its development as a result of its 
institutions becoming overextended (enlargement 
of the European Union), the growing divergence 
of interests of the member countries, differing 
perceptions of priorities (the Mediterranean, Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe), economic changes and 
their social consequences, a strengthening of 
nationalist tendencies and nations looking 
inwards (out of fear of migration) and the weak-
ness of governments and national parliaments in 
remedying problems that extend beyond the 
national framework. 
57. Several proposals for dealing with this 
situation have been made concerning the institu-
tional development of the Union, strengthening 
the "hard core" (composed of five or six coun-
tries involved in a process of advanced currency 
and political integration), deepening Franco-Ger-
man relations, strengthening the Union's ability to 
act in foreign policy and security matters and 
extending the Union to the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe. In the institutional sphere, 
the document suggests drawing on the federal 
model, with clear demarcation of responsibilities 
at European, national and regional levels. The 
power structure revolves, as is presently the case, 
around the Council of the Union, the Commission 
and the European Parliament, but the Council and 
the Parliament would share the legislative func-
tion, with the first acting as a second chamber (the 
Chamber of States), while the Commission would 
have the duties of a " European Government ". 
58. This structure, intended in principle to 
make the Union function more efficiently, never-
theless leaves national parliaments out of the 
European process, as their power of supervision 
would apply only indirectly through the Chamber 
of States (the present Council of the Union), being 
exercised, a priori, uniquely over the national 
government, while decisions are taken in a com-
munity or intergovernmental framework and are 
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binding on governments in respect of their part-
ners. That is one of the weaknesses of this docu-
ment, which will have to be revised, as it leads to 
marginalisation of the only political representa-
tion available to the peoples of the member coun-
tries of the Union, the source of each state's sove-
reignty, including that of Germany, even if the 
authors attribute " in parallel, not as a priority ... 
prime importance to the participation of national 
parliaments in creating political will in Eur-
ope " 22• 
59. During its working visit to the Bundestag in 
March 1995, the Assembly's Committee for Par-
liamentary and Public Relations was able to gain 
an impression of the state of the discussions being 
held in the German Parliament on the intergovern-
mental conference. For Mrs. Rita Siissmuth, Pre-
sident of the Bundestag, there would be no sense 
in WEU remaining outside community structures: 
even if a merger were not immediate, it should at 
least be effective when the modified Brussels 
Treaty became due for review in 1998. In terms of 
parliamentary supervision, she believed it would 
frrst be necessary to strengthen the responsibili-
ties of the European Parliament instead of crea-
ting new parliamentary structures - such as a 
second chamber of the European Parliament. 
60. A draft resolution of the Bundesrat on the 
preparation of the 1996 conference follows simi-
lar lines by proposing better definition of the areas 
of responsibility of the Union, its institutions and 
the member states and bringing the second 
(CFSP) and third (Justice) pillars of intergovern-
mental co-operation into the community. Accor-
ding to this text, the European Parliament should 
have greater powers of eo-decision alongside the 
Council and the number of topics requiring a qua-
lified majority or unanimous vote in the Council 
should be reduced. The document furthermore 
specifies that national parliaments and the Euro-
pean Parliament should co-operate closely in pre-
paring the Conference and implementing the 
results·23 • 
(iv) Belgium and the 1996 intergovernmental 
conference 
61. The committee for opinion responsible for 
European questions in Belgium's House of Repre-
sentatives has published an interim report on the 
issue 24 according to which the conference should 
have a two-fold objective: "develop a medium-
22. Idem, page 5. 
23. Bundesrat, Antrag der Liinder Bayem und Rheinland-
Pfalz, Drucksache 169/95, 24th March 1995. 
24. House of Representatives of Belgium, interim report on 
the 1996 intergovernmental conference: Rapporteurs, MM. 
Eyskens and Willcokx; No. 1783/1 - 94/95, 30th March 
1995. 
and long-term political programme for all areas 
for which the European Union could and should 
assume responsibility ... ; make the required 
amendments to the treaty in areas where this 
should prove necessary, particularly for institutio-
nal reasons .... In any event, any institutional 
reform should have a purpose, namely to permit 
enlargement through deepening ". The institutio-
nal reform of the Union is, according to the 
authors, the primary condition for completing the 
process of accession of new members and the 
introduction of monetary union is, in their view, a 
major requirement, since it is probably the only 
real lever for achieving a deepening. 
62. The interim report also advocates estab-
lishing a procedure for voluntary withdrawal or 
exclusion of a member state and the rejection of a 
" Europe a la carte " where " each member state 
would decide independently which component of 
European policy it intended to implement ". Here 
too, the "hard core" theory receives a less than 
enthusiastic welcome and a multi-speed Europe 
within which the pace of integration would not be 
identical for the various member states is accep-
table as a temporary interim solution ... ; it cannot 
become an end in itself ". Indeed, the concept of a 
federal Europe with strong community institu-
tions like the Commission and the Parliament 
would seem to be preferred by the Rapporteurs. 
63. The CFSP should be the sole responsibility 
of the community institutions and decisions in this 
area would be taken by qualified majority. Propo-
sals regarding WEU are more tentative since the 
Rapporteurs admit that " it is in principle desi-
rable for WEU to be integrated into the European 
Union". At the same time they advocate WEU's 
organic involvement in NATO. It is necessary too 
for European Union members also to join WEU 
and to be members of NATO .... Consequently 
any form of detachment is to be avoided and the 
European Union should defend Atlantic solidarity 
in a convincing manner. Moreover the Rappor-
teurs consider it desirable for COREPER 25 to be 
associated with the working ofWEU: states might 
replace their ambassadors to WEU by their per-
manent representative to the European Union. As 
to the WEU Assembly, the Rapporteurs wonder 
whether it should not be composed of members of 
the European Parliament, an idea which concords 
with the resolutions adopted by the latter in this 
connection. 
64. With regard to parliamentary supervision, 
the idea of a European senate composed of dele-
gations of national parliaments is rejected in 
favour of establishing a body for contacts and 
consultation between national parliaments. This 
converges with the proposal of the French Senate 
25. Committee of permanent representatives of member 
states. 
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Delegation to the European Parliament which 
advocates the creation of an interparliamentary 
committee or strengthening the responsibilities of 
the CEAC. The number of European parliamenta-
rians would be reduced but the European Parlia-
ment's powers of eo-decision would be extended. 
This interim report opts firmly in favour of streng-
thening community structures and the European 
Parliament as opposed to attempts to renationalise 
European policy and resorting too much to inter-
governmental procedures. 
65. The proposals set out in this report are to be 
the subject of an in-depth debate during the 
second half of this year in the Chamber of Repre-
sentatives, whose membership has changed follo-
wing the elections in May 1995. The Consultative 
Committee of the Belgian Senate has a more qua-
lified position on these questions; it envisages the 
integration of WEU into the European Union in 
the framework of a process of gradual rapproche-
ment, while maintaining effective parliamentary 
supervision of security and defence questions. 
66. The proposals and current debates in the 
national parliaments give an insight into the pos-
sible options for parliamentary supervision of 
European decisions, be it by establishing a second 
European parliamentary chamber representative 
of national parliaments, or by strengthening at 
national level the powers of parliaments over the 
European policies of governments or again by a 
transfer of legislative powers from the Council of 
the Union to the European Parliament. Opinions 
on the subject are not confined to the cases men-
tioned and the thinking in progress in other natio-
nal parliaments will further contribute to these 
questions along lines which, depending on natio-
nal traditions, will be based on one or other of the 
views expressed. At the same time, introduction 
of the parliamentary dimension into the European 
context is also achieved through development of 
interparliamentary co-operation. 
(b) European interparliamentary co-operation 
67. The national parliaments of the member 
countries of the European Union and WEU parti-
cipate in the community process to varying 
extents. However, one cannot help but note that 
this participation remains largely beyond their 
reach and is frequently confined to discussion and 
approval of legislation and community decisions 
ratified by the Council of Ministers of the Union. 
68. In relation to the CFSP, for example, Title 
V of the Maastricht Treaty makes no reference 
whatsoever to the role of national parliaments, but 
does mention that of the European Parliament. 
Once aware of the situation, national parliaments 
responded by stepping up interparliamentary co-
operation in order to face up to the implications of 
Maastricht and have their say at the intergovern-
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mental conference. This co-operation is being 
developed for the main part within the CEAC and 
the Conference of Speakers. 
(i) CEAC- Conference of European Affairs 
Committees 
69. CEAC held its first meeting in November 
1989 and has since met half-yearly to discuss sub-
jects which fall within the European Union's areas 
of responsibility; it is composed of national and 
European parliamentarians. Meetings are held in 
the country of the presidency of the Council of the 
Union, thus enabling parliamentarians to be infor-
med of the programme of the current presidency 
and to make their views known. 
70. From the time the Maastricht Treaty took 
effect and since the initial development of the 
CFSP, CEAC has been used to clarify the role of 
national parliaments in this area, as noted in the 
conclusions adopted at the VIIIth conference 26 
held in Copenhagen on 4th and 5th May 1993. 
According to these conclusions, participants 
agreed that parliamentary supervision of intergo-
vernmental co-operation was most important, 
despite the fact that such co-operation did not fall 
within the sphere of the Community. 
71. For them to exercise this supervision in 
full, national parliaments need to be informed by 
governments, the Council of Ministers and the 
Commission about decisions to be taken, within a 
time-frame allowing them to discuss matters in 
full possession of the facts. This is far from 
always being the case, as current procedure in the 
majority of countries frequently limits the powers 
of national parliaments in this respect even if in 
certain cases they express the wish to intervene 
over and above the community decision-making 
process. 
72. It was in part this question that the Xth 
conference sought to answer at its meeting in 
Athens on 9th and lOth May 1994 which dealt 
mainly with the democratic deficit and transpa-
rency in the decision-making process 27• The dis-
cussions provided an opportunity to emphasise 
that if there was a perceived democratic deficit 
this was largely because governments were not 
sufficiently answerable to their national parlia-
ments 28 • This facet of the problem is sometimes 
neglected when discussing the powers of national 
parliaments in European policy matters. 
73. In the area of the CFSP, this weakness 
might become even more acute because of the 
growing trend for the executive to treat such ques-
26. National Assembly (France), Information report No. 143 
(amended), 5th May 1993, page 15. 
27. National Assembly (France), Information report No. 
1237, 17th May 1994. 
28. Idem, page 13. 
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tions as confidential, indeed, to shroud them in 
official secrecy. The contradiction here between 
official speeches to national parliaments calling 
for further commitment to the European process 
and the unwillingness of the Council of Ministers 
of the European Union to authorise publication of 
documents drafted by the Council and its commit-
tees during the preparation of Council decisions 
on European Union 29 legislation is all too evident. 
CEAC, aware of the need to resolve these issues, 
included an item on the role of national parlia-
ments in the institutional development of the 
European Union 30 in the agenda of its Xllth mee-
ting on 27th and 28th February 1995. 
74. At the Xllth conference and in the debate 
on the role of national parliaments in the Euro-
pean Union and their participation in the prepara-
tory work for the intergovernmental conference, 
the French proposal for the creation of a second 
European chamber and associating national par-
liaments more closely with the group of experts 
preparing the intergovernmental conference met 
with little response 31 • The Luxembourg represen-
tation opted for maintaining the half-yearly confe-
rences and making them more effective 32, partly 
concurring with the French National Assembly 
delegation proposal for creating an interparlia-
mentary committee 33 • 
75. The Danish Delegation adopted a position 
in favour of clear demarcation between European, 
national and regional areas of responsibility. 
Spain and Belgium stated they v,:ere in favour of 
strengthening the supervision exercised by their 
parliaments over national European policies 34 - a 
sensitive issue as it is closely linked to the func-
tioning of the institutions and political tradition of 
individual countries, which does not encourage a 
harmonisation of procedures in this area between 
parliaments. These institutional differences also 
explain in part the informal role of the Conferen-
ce of Speakers of National Parliaments of the 
European Union. The participants agreed to pur-
sue the debate on the preparation of the intergo-
29. Netherlands draft motion on transparency; National 
Assembly (France), Information report No. 1237, 17th May 
1994, Appendix 3, page 53. 
30. National Assembly (France), Information report No. 
1660, 15th November 1994, page 37. 
31. House of Representatives and Senate of Belgium: report 
on the conference of Conference of European Affairs Com-
mittees (CEAC XII), Paris, 27th and 28th February 1995; 
No. 1769/1 - 94/95 and 1369-1 (1994-1995), 24th March 
1995. 
32. Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Chamber of Deputies, 
extract from proceedings No. 5/94-95, page 7. 
33. French National Assembly, Information Report No. 1939 
on institutional reform of the European Union, 8th February 
1995, pages 99-100. 
34. Le Monde, 2nd March 1995, page 4. 
vernmental conference at the next CEAC meeting 
which is to be held in Madrid in the second half of 
1995. 
(ii) The Conference of Speakers of National 
Parliaments 
76. A more informal body, the Conference of 
Speakers of National Parliaments (which also 
includes the European Parliament) has met on 
average once every two years, since 1975. It 
groups speakers with different statuses, some 
having a more political than procedural role, and 
allows exchanges of views on such questions as 
parliamentary supervision, links between parlia-
ments and electors, the media and power and 
other related questions·35 • 
77. The participation of national parliaments in 
the reform of European institutions as envisaged 
after 1996 was a central issue in the discussions 
during an informal meeting of speakers in Bonn 
on 12th September 1994, when members set 
themselves two major goals: to participate to the 
greatest extent possible in discussions on the 
reform of the European institutions before deci-
sions were reached at the 1996 intergovernmental 
conference and to work together to ensure natio-
nal parliaments took a leading role. At that mee-
ting it was proposed to set up a small working 
group to prepare a conference of national parlia-
ments for the second half of 1995, in order to 
assert their views before decisions are taken in 
1996 36• 
78. CEAC and the Conference are two mecha-
nisms for dialogue and exchange of interparlia-
mentary views, but they are a long way from co-
ordinating national parliaments' attitudes to 
Community-related questions. For the CFSP and 
European defence, no structures yet exist for brin-
ging together defence and foreign affairs commit-
tees of national parliaments and this shortcoming 
is one the WEU Assembly should take upon itself 
to rectify. In the meantime, two European parlia-
mentary institutions, the European Parliament and 
the Assembly ofWEU, are endeavouring, each in 
its own way, to introduce a real parliamentary 
dimension into this debate. 
(c) The role of European parliamentary institutions 
79. European security and defence remain 
essentially within the area of intergovernmental 
co-operation, despite mention here and there of a 
European army or a European defence policy. In 
point of fact, leaving aside the speeches and 
35. See for example Conference of Speakers of the European 
parliamentary assemblies - Summary report, The Hague, 
24th and 25th June 1994 (Netherlands Parliament edition). 
36. Le Monde, 13th September 1994. 
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declarations of principle, there is a European 
defence which, although not integrated, is ensured 
in an intergovernmental framework by WEU, and 
a Euro-f\tlantic defence which, through NATO, 
has an integrated command structure, but which is 
not supranational. 
80. Both these organisations have a more or 
less well-defined collective defence role (see the 
fifth article of their respective treaties). The fact 
remains, however, that there are no forces perma-
nently assigned to WEU, nor is there a single 
command. Member states decide, case by case, 
the possible contribution they will make to any 
joint action, on the basis of national criteria. 
81. In the framework of the CFSP and the defi-
nition of a common defence policy, it will be 
necessary, if we are to have a credible instrument 
at our disposal, for our respective defence policies 
to be made more " European " by pursuing the 
harmonisation of personnel, equipment and cur-
rent military doctrine. These are difficult steps, 
touching as they do upon one of the principal 
attributes of state sovereignty: national defence. 
For to succeed, states must be agreed on such a 
development and public opinion and national par-
liaments must also support it. This also presup-
poses a common vision of the problems stretching 
beyond mere national considerations. It is in this 
area that the WEU Assembly can best contribute 
to establishing a European security and defence 
policy. 
(i) The European Parliament 
82. The European Parliament, elected by uni-
versal suffrage in a manner specific to each mem-
ber country of the Union, has experienced a quali-
tative enhancement of its role through the entry 
into force of the Maastricht Treaty. It now has 
very real powers in implementing the CFSP, des-
pite difficulties in their application, and would 
wish to see them extended. 
83. Article J.7 of Title V of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union gives the parliament specific powers 
in relation to the CFSP: 
- " The Presidency shall consult the Euro-
pean Parliament on the main aspects and 
the basic choices of the common foreign 
and security policy and shall ensure that 
the views of the European Parliament are 
duly taken into consideration. The Euro-
pean Parliament should be kept regularly 
informed by the Presidency and the Com-
mission of the development of the 
Union's foreign and security policy. 
- The European Parliament may ask ques-
tions of the Council or make recommen-
dations to it. It shall hold an annual deba-
te on implementing the common foreign 
and security policy. " 
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84. Additionally, the European Parliament is 
sending two representatives to participate in the 
preparation of the intergovernmental conference, 
whereas national parliaments and the WEU 
Assembly, which wish to make a contribution and 
be present at the negotiating table, are having dif-
ficulty in this respect, although they will be called 
upon subsequently to ratify the results 37• 
85. The European Parliament lost no time in 
seizing the opportunity to affirm its prerogatives 
and, since 1993, has worked on the CFSP at the 
expense in particular of those who might be part-
ners and help to strengthen parliamentary supervi-
sion of intergovernmental initiatives in these 
questions, namely the national parliaments and 
the WEU Assembly. One of the aims of the Euro-
pean Parliament is to acquire prerogatives in 
supervising the CFSP budget, which it does not at 
present possess. Its ability to take action is never-
theless real, as Turkey discovered in discussions 
held in February 1995 on its proposed customs 
union with the European Union which in no way 
detracted from the difficulties encountered in 
what were already sensitive negotiations 38 • 
86. In security and defence matters, the Euro-
pean Parliament is proposing the gradual replace-
ment of intergovernmental by community proce-
dures, the absorption of WEU by the European 
Union, the submission of military operations deci-
ded by WEU to authorisation from the European 
Parliament and the intensification of co-operation 
with the WEU Assembly, the latter eventually 
being replaced by the European Parliament 39• At 
the same time it is calling for more systematic 
democratic control of the decisions of the Euro-
pean Union, in association with the national par-
liaments. To this end, it is proposed, in a docu-
ment by the Institutional Committee on the 
Development of the Union, to include directly in 
the Treaty on European Union a revised version of 
Declaration 13 annexed to the Maastricht Treaty 
on the role of national parliaments, urging 
governments to allow sufficient time to enable 
them to decide on the new European Union legis-
lation without unduly delaying the decision-
making process 40• 
87. The text also proposes that national parlia-
ments be more closely associated with the annual 
37. Apart from the WEU Assembly which has only a consul-
tative rOle. 
38. Greece was opposed to signing the agreement with Tur-
key as long as the Union failed to give firm undertakings 
regarding the future accession of Cyprus. 
39. European Parliament: Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Security and Defence Policy; sub-committee on security and 
disarmament; PE 211.388, 19th December 1994, pages 3-4. 
40. European Parliament: Committee on Institutional 
Affairs; draft report on the development of the European 
Union; part A: draft resolution; Rapporteur Mr. David Mar-
tin; PE 211.919/A, 16th March 1995, pages 7-8. 
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legislative programme and, with the intergovern-
mental conference in view, asks for a consultative 
conference of parliaments to be convened, which 
might be held at the start and end of the conferen-
ce41. These approaches to national parliaments are 
nevertheless set in the context of a prospective 
increase in the European Parliament's powers, 
making it the mainspring of parliamentary super-
vision in Europe. 
88. This aim is set out clearly in another draft 
report of the Institutional Committee, adopted in 
May 1995, which states, in reference to parlia-
mentary supervision: 
" The foreseeable emergence of restricted 
circles of integration in the areas of mone-
tary union, WEU or the Schengen area 
poses a serious threat to the very existence 
of parliamentary control. Whenever Union 
policies are pursued within a specific insti-
tutional framework and for a period of 
several years by a restricted number of 
member states, it is therefore vital to set up 
an ad hoc body to exercise parliamentary 
control. Such ad hoc bodies which would 
have to be restricted in size and composed 
exclusively of members of the European 
Parliament from the member states concer-
ned, could be administered by the secreta-
riat of the European Parliament, which 
would thus play a pivotal role in a genuine 
European system of parliamentary control 
(ESPC). "42. 
89. These proposals are an accurate reflection 
of the European Parliament's wish" to increase its 
prerogatives at all levels of operation and in all 
areas of responsibility of the European Union. In 
security and defence matters, the present intergo-
vernmental character of the CFSP prevents it from 
exercising close supervision of Council initia-
tives, hence the demand for the second pillar of 
the Union to be brought into the community and 
for the integration of WEU in the structures of the 
latter. This is a sensitive subject affecting both the 
prerogatives of states and national parliaments 
and those of the WEU Assembly, which is the 
only European parliamentary institution wholly 
concerned with security and defence questions. 
(ii) The Western European Union Assembly 
90. The WEU Assembly remains an institution 
apart, as the only European parliamentary body 
with acknowledged treaty powers in security and 
41. Idem, page 13. 
42. European Parliament: Committee on Institutional 
Affairs; draft report on the operation of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union with a view to the 1996 intergovernmental confe-
rence - implementation, Part A: Motion for a resolution; 
Rapporteur Mr. Jean-Louis Bour1anges; PE 211.920/A, lOth 
April1995. page 14. 
defence matters. Article IX of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty states that " the Council of Western 
European Union shall make an annual report on 
its activities and in particular concerning the 
control of armaments to an Assembly composed 
of representatives of the Brussels Treaty powers 
to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of 
Europe". 
91. Over the years, the Assembly has widened 
its areas of responsibility to all major areas rela-
ting to security and defence. However, it shared 
WEU's relatively low profile throughout most of 
the cold war years, despite its recommendations 
asking the Council to shoulder its responsibilities 
more effectively. 
92. The Maastricht Treaty and the implementa-
tion of the decisions on the CFSP mean that the 
Assembly must define and assert its rightful place 
within the new structures of Europe. For, although 
its responsibilities are not called in question, its 
sphere of action must be shared with other institu-
tions such as the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Assembly, 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE and the 
European Parliament. 
93. The Assembly is the European forum 
where national parliamentarians can air their 
points of view and ideas, thus contributing to the 
emergence of a European parliamentary identity 
in security and defence matters. In this context, in 
Paris, in October 1994, the Assembly brought 
together the chairmen of defence and foreign 
affairs committees of all the member countries of 
WEU, irrespective of status. These initiatives, 
together with its recommendations to the Council 
of Ministers, allow the Assembly to take a posi-
tion in the debate forming the prelude to the inter-
governmental conference, although it is to be 
regretted that the Council has not responded to the 
Assembly's request to take part in the work of the 
WEU " think tank " responsible for preparing the 
organisation's contribution to the conference. 
94. This situation has implications for relations 
with the European Parliament, as proposals have 
been made for the latter to absorb the Assembly, 
although the modified Brussels Treaty is still in 
force and will very likely remain so after 1998 43 , 
as the President of the Assembly, Sir Dudley 
Smith, stated at the opening of the Paris colloquy. 
It is logical and desirable for the Assembly, as an 
integral part of WEU, to be asked to be involved 
in revising the declaration adopted by the minis-
ters at Maastricht. At the same time it is necessa-
ry to consider the reforms that will be necessary to 
enable it to play its full part as the parliamentary 
43. The WEU Council of Ministers takes a different view to 
the Assembly and believes the fifty-year time limit under 
Article Xll of the modified Brussels Treaty starts in 1948 and 
not 1954. 
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component of the sole European defence organi-
sation. 
95. This is no easy matter given the uncertainty 
over the future of WEU, whose existence is not 
threatened, but whose future nature and relations 
with the European Union are as yet unknown. In 
this area, the intentions of governments differ and 
only the United Kingdom Government has openly 
taken a position on the question in its memoran-
dum, by asserting its preference for intergovern-
mental co-operation in relation to the CFSP and 
the European defence policy and stating that 
WEU should remain separate from the European 
Union. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ger-
many, Mr. Klaus Kinkel 44, and the Netherlands 
Government45 have for their part stated they are in 
favour of the integration of WEU in the European 
Union. The 1998 deadline also holds uncertainty 
as it is not known whether the modified Brussels 
Treaty will be maintained in its present form or 
possibly revised. 
96. In any event, one of the problems to which 
a solution will have to be found in the medium 
term is that of national representation in the 
Assembly, which is at present the same as the par-
liamentary delegations to the Council of Europe. 
In the event of the modified Brussels Treaty being 
revised, it might be desirable for the composition 
of the Assembly to reflect that of the defence and 
possibly also foreign and European affairs com-
mittees of the national parliaments. Links with the 
delegations to the North Atlantic Assembly 
should also be sought in order to ensure a com-
mon parliamentary representation of the Euro-
pean pillar of the alliance in that institution. 
97. Nor is the present consultative role of the 
Assembly entirely adequate to ensure parliamen-
tary supervision with the participation of national 
parliaments in decisions concerning European 
security and defence. The possibility of giving 
consultative opinions on decisions already taken 
or to be taken in future by the WEU Council 
would be a political factor of greater impact than 
the present procedure of recommendations to the 
Council. In the event of a military operation, of 
the Petersberg type for example 46, requiring 
44. Die Zeit, 9th March 1995. 
45. Bulletin Europe, No. 6453, 1st April1995, page 2; Report 
of the Netherlands Government on the common foreign, 
security and defence policy of the European Union: towards 
more energetic action abroad ". 
46. WEU's military missions are defined in paragraph 4 of 
Part IT of the Petersberg declaration which provides that: 
" Apart from contributing to the common defence in accor-
dance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V 
of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, military units of 
WEU member states, acting under the authority of WEU, 
could be employed for: humanitarian and rescue tasks; 
peace-keeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis-mana-
gement, including peace-making"; Document 1322, 29th 
June 1992. 
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troops to be sent to a region in the throes of 
conflict, consulting the Assembly, coupled with a 
vote in national parliaments authorising the 
deployment of troops in the framework of such 
missions would constitute the element of Euro-
pean parliamentary supervision that is at present 
lacking. 
98. By thus strengthening the link between the 
Assembly and the national parliaments, such pro-
cedure also preserves and affirms the intergovern-
mental nature of European security and defence, 
without diminishing its effectiveness, and elimi-
nates the democratic deficit at national and Euro-
pean levels of which intergovernmental co-opera-
tion stands accused. This also assumes that the 
quality of the relationship between the Assembly 
and the Council, including the Secretariat-Gene-
ral and other WEU bodies, is improved, particu-
larly as regards information. It is in this perspec-
tive that an Assembly composed of representatives 
from national defence and foreign affairs commit-
tees acquires its full meaning. 
99. Proposals in this direction have moreover 
been presented in a study carried out jointly by 
the WEU Institute for Security Studies and the 
European Strategy Group, which might be consi-
dered as a contribution to the 1996 conference. In 
this collective work the authors suggest estab-
lishing a joint parliamentary defence committee 
formed by representatives of the European Par-
liament together with members of the defence 
committees of national parliaments. According to 
the authors, such a committee might gain more 
budgetary and control powers than the present 
Assembly of WEU, which might be reformed to 
that end 47• This will clearly be a matter of conti-
nuing debate. 
47. Towards a common defence policy- study by the Euro-
pean Strategy Group and the WEU Institute for Security Stu-
dies, 1995, page 68. 
100. In its report adopted in Lisbon on 16th May 
1995 on the future of European security and the 
preparation of Maastricht II - reply to the fortieth 
annual report of the Council, the Political Com-
mittee of the Assembly considers, on the contrary, 
that " one must reject any proposal tending to 
create mixed parliamentary institutions " 48 • 
According to the Rapporteur, " this solution would 
not only have the disadvantage of creating a two-
speed [European parliamentary] assembly, but, far 
from improving efficiency, would contribute also 
to a blurring of responsibilities. " On this matter, 
the committee stated that it favoured the creation 
of a second European chamber, alongside the 
European Parliament, composed of " delegations 
from national parliaments, with responsibilities 
that are different from and complementary to those 
of the European Parliament " 49 which would deal 
with security and defence questions. 
101. The decisions to be taken by the 1996 inter-
governmental conference will affect the future of 
WEU and also that of the Assembly. But, at the 
same time, it is necessary to maintain and optim-
ise parliamentary supervision and participation at 
both national and European level, with the help of 
a reformed WEU Assembly with wider responsi-
bilities and which is even more representative. 
This report is not directly concerned with the 
wider political arguments on future relations bet-
ween the EU and WEU, but there can be little 
doubt that any steps towards bringing defence 
matters within the competence of the European 
Commission and European Parliament might 
endanger the effective scrutiny of defence and 
security matters by national parliaments and the 
WEU Assembly, through which the sovereignty 
of nation states continues to be expressed in the 
late twentieth century. 
48. The future of European security and the preparation of 
Maastricht II - reply to the fortieth annual report of the Coun-
cil; Document 1458, paragraph 84, 16th May 1995. 
49. Idem; draft recommendation, paragraph 1.8. 
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